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Abstract
We investigate R&D incentive under patent protection with coop-
eration option. Chowdhury [Economics Letters, 2005, 89(1), 120-126]
claims that patent protection may decrease R&D incentive when the
tournament effect (TE) is negative. However, We show that patent
protection in the presence of R&D cooperation option always increases
R&D incentive. In addition, to increase R&D incentive, this option
strictly dominates imitation and may dominate royalty licensing under
patent protection, introduced by Mukherjee [Economics Letters, 2006,
93(2), 196-201].
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1 Introduction
Patent protection has been widely applied as one of the most important policies
to encourage R&D incentives and reduce technology free riding (spillover) among
competitive firms. However, Chowdhury (2005) shows that patent protection may
adversely reduce R&D incentive via the tournament effect (TE) if firms simultane-
ously undertake similar activities of technology innovation. In the same scenario,
Mukherjee (2006) claims that the effect from either imitation or royalty licensing
under patent protection is likely to dominate TE, which implies that patent pro-
tection may still be effective to raise R&D incentive in the presence of imitation or
royalty licensing.
Although technology spillover decreases to zero under patent protection, obvi-
ously, cooperative R&D as an option can still be undertaken by firms1. Rather,
because of uncertainty from patenting tournament, it may increase incentive of co-
operation in R&D. In this paper, we incorporate cooperation option into patent
protection of encouraging R&D incentive, which is not considered in the cases of
Chowdhury (2005) and Mukherjee (2006). We show that patent protection always
increase R&D incentive in the presence of R&D cooperation option. In addition,
to increase R&D incentive, cooperative R&D strictly dominates imitation and may
dominate royalty licensing under patent protection.
2 The Setup
A duopoly market consists of two firms, 1 and 2, who produce a homogeneous
good. Let qi be the output of firm i, i = 1, 2. The inverse market demand function
is f(q), where q = q1 + q2, and it satisfies f ′ < 0, f ′′ < 0 and f ′ + qif ′′ < 0,∀q, qi.
Initially, each firm produces with the cost function cq and receives a payoff pi(c, c),
but by investing F on R&D, the cost function can reduce to c′q, where c′ ∈ [0, c].
We consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, firms simultaneously decide to
whether invest F on R&D or not. In stage 2, they have a Cournot-quantity com-
petition in the market. Under no-patent protection, the firm without investing on
1The possibility of cooperative R&D among firms has also been discussed, such as
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992) and Kamien, Muller, and Zang
(1992), etc. They show that cooperative R&D but competition in product market is
socially optimal if spillover is large enough. So in this paper, we define cooperative R&D
under patent protection as R&D cooperation in stage 1, but product competition in stage
2.
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R&D can benefit from its rival’s technology spillover who invests, thus the marginal
cost of the non-innovating firm decreases from c to c˜, where c′ ≤ c˜ ≤ c. However,
under patent protection, this possibility of technology spillover (free riding) is elim-
inated. Therefore, the marginal cost of the non-innovating firm remains at c. We
solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium through backward induction.
Furthermore, without loss of generality, in this paper, we assume that in the
situation of cooperative R&D under patent protection, two firms share the cost F
equally but both can reduce their marginal cost from c to c′. Hence, the payoff of
each firm is pi(c′, c′)− F2 . Moreover, we know that the following inequality should
hold: pi(c′, c′)− pi(c, c) > F2 .2
Table 1: Payoffs under patent protection with cooperative R&D option3
Cooperative R&D No R&D
Cooperative R&D pi(c′, c′)− F2 , pi(c′, c′)− F2 pi1(c′, c)− F , pi2(c′, c)
No R&D pi1(c, c′), pi2(c, c′)− F pi(c, c), pi(c, c)
Then, from Table (1.), under patent protection with cooperative R&D option,
we can obtain the non-strategic incentive (N(C)) and the strategic incentive (S(C))
of firm 1 as follows
N(C) = pi1(c′, c)− pi(c, c)− F (1)
and
S(C) = pi(c′, c′)− pi1(c, c′)− F2 (2)
3 Cooperative R&D and Patent Protection
In this section, we investigate firms’ choices under patent protection with coop-
erative R&D option. Following Chowdhury (2005), N(NP) and N(P) represent the
non-strategic incentive of non-patent competition and patent protection; S(NP)
2Since under no patent protection, the minimum condition of both firms investing R&D
should be such that pi(c′, c′) − pi(c, c) ≥ F , which implies the inequality in cooperative
R&D.
3Furthermore, we assume that if one firm chooses to innovate itself but the other firm
chooses R&D cooperation, because R&D requires time processing, then it is very likely that
the firm choosing cooperative R&D realizes its rival’s decision of noncooperative R&D,
and adds up to the entire cost F in order to accomplish the R&D. As a result, both firms
are still in a patent tournament and the expected payoff of each firm is pi1(c
′,c)+pi1(c,c′)
2
−F .
3
and S(P) represent the strategic incentive of non-patent competition and patent
protection.
The non-strategic incentive for R&D does not change when both firms choose
cooperative R&D under patent protection. So we only need to compare strategic
incentive of R&D investment between patenting and cooperative R&D:
S(P )− S(C) =
[
pi1(c′, c) + pi1(c, c′)
2
− pi(c′, c′)
]
− F
2
(3)
The first term in the square bracket is the tournament effect. Consequently,
we also see that firms choose patenting if and only if S(P ) − S(C) ≥ 0, which
indicates that if R&D cooperation is available for firms under patent protection,
patenting only generates more strategic incentive for R&D than that of cooperation
when TE ≥ F2 ; otherwise, cooperative R&D is preferred under patent protection.
Furthermore, when TE < 0, since S(P )− S(C) < 0 and pi(c′, c′)− pi(c, c) > F2 , the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is both firms choosing cooperative R&D under
patent protection. Thus, this observation gives the following proposition:
Proposition 1. R&D incentive always increases under patent protection with co-
operative R&D option irrespective of the tournament effect. If TE < 0, firms choose
cooperative R&D under patent protection.
4 Imitation, Royalty Licensing versus Cooperative
R&D
Mukherjee (2006) introduces the effects of non-infringing imitation and royalty
licensing under patent protection to demonstrate that their effects may always dom-
inate the tournament effect and thus raise firms’ incentives for R&D investments.
In this section, we compare effects of cooperative R&D, imitation and royalty licens-
ing on R&D incentive under patent protection. Our result shows that to increase
R&D incentive, cooperative R&D strictly dominates imitation and may dominate
royalty licensing under patent protection.
4.1 Imitation versus Cooperative R&D
Under patent protection with non-infringing imitation, each firm still competes
to obtain the patent with probability 1/2 under bilateral R&D. Additionally, the
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patent loser could invest I around the protected innovation with probability z,
where z ∈ (0, 1), and reduce its marginal cost to c′. Therefore, the non-strategic
and strategic incentives for R&D of a firm under this system are N(I) = zpi1(c′, c˜)+
(1 − z)pi1(c′, c) − pi(c, c) − F and S(I) = z[pi(c′, c′) − pi1(c˜, c′)] + (1−z)2 [pi(c′, c) −
pi1(c, c′)]− F + I2 , respectively.
Then we compare R&D incentive in these two regimes. Obviously, cooperative
R&D creates higher non-strategic incentive for firms than that of imitation under
patent protection, as follows:
N(C)−N(I) = z[pi1(c′, c)− pi1(c′, c˜)] > 0 (4)
Furthermore, the strategic incentive with cooperative R&D and imitation under
patent protection given by
S(C)− S(I) = (1− z)
[
pi(c′, c′)− pi1(c
′, c) + pi1(c, c′)
2
]
+
z[pi1(c˜, c′)− pi1(c, c′)] + F − I2 > 0 (5)
Mukherjee (2006) shows that R&D investment increases, if imitation is very likely
under patent protection. Intuitively, this feasible high possibility to make imitation
can be explained as follows: when both firms invest on R&D, the patent loser has
already incurred F in innovation research, and then owns sufficient knowledge about
the new technology, which leads non-infringing imitation to be easily successful
(z is very high but F > I). Therefore, if imitation is very likely, i.e., z → 1,
Eq(5.) always holds, which indicates that cooperative R&D of firms induces more
strategic incentive for R&D than that of imitation under patent protection. Thus,
to increase R&D incentive, cooperative R&D strictly dominates imitation under
patent protection.
4.2 Royalty Licensing versus Cooperative R&D
Under patent protection with royalty licensing, firms compete in patent tourna-
ment with probability 1/2. The patent holder may sell royalty licensing by charg-
ing a royalty of G(., .) to the non-patent holder so the patent loser can reduce its
marginal cost from c to c′. Consequently, the non-strategic and strategic incentives
for R&D of firm 1 under this regime are N(RL) = pi1(c′, c) +G(c′, c)− pi(c, c)− F
and S(RL) = pi1(c
′,c)+G(c′,c)−pi1(c,c′)
2 − F , respectively. Since N(RL) − N(C) > 0,
5
royalty licensing creates higher non-strategic incentive for R&D than cooperative
R&D under patent protection. Moreover, the strategic incentive for R&D under
cooperative R&D is given by
S(C)− S(RL) = pi(c′, c′)− pi1(c
′, c) + pi1(c, c′)
2
− G(c
′, c)
2
+
F
2
(6)
which depends on F , then we have S(C) − S(RL) S 0.4 Obviously, N(C) and
N(RL) are greater than N(NP ), so the choice between cooperative R&D and
royalty licensing under patent protection depends upon the sign of Eq.(6). Thus,
we have the following result
Proposition 2. Cooperative R&D of firms creates higher R&D incentive than that
of imitation under patent protection. Moreover, either cooperative R&D or royalty
licensing would be preferred, particularly depending on the magnitude of F , even if
both regimes under patent protection increase R&D incentive.5
4Mukherjee (2006) only shows that the optimal level of royalty implies [pi1(c
′, c) +
G(c′, c)] > [2pi(c′, c′)− pi1(c, c′)].
5Specifically, Che and Yang (2009) also consider the same scenario but patent pro-
tection is with fixed-fee licensing. They show that patent protection in the presence of
fixed-fee licensing always increases R&D incentive. Furthermore, here we can compare
which regime creates higher R&D incentive between cooperative R&D and fixed-fee li-
censing under patent protection. Following Che and Yang (2009), first, we have that
N(FL) = pi(c′, c′) − pi(c, c) +K(c′, c) − F and S(FL) = K(c, c′) − F , where the licenser
can offer a contract with fixed-fee licensing K(., .) after R&D, and the licensee accepts the
contract if it is not worse off than no fixed-fee licensing. Since the game is symmetric, the
optimal license under patent protection with fixed-fee licensing implies that
K(c′, c) = pi(c′, c′)− pi1(c, c′) = pi1(c′, c)− pi(c′, c′) (7)
Then we compare R&D incentive in these two regimes. Obviously, cooperative R&D
creates the same non-strategic incentive for firms as that of fixed-fee licensing under patent
protection, as follows:
N(C)−N(FL) = pi1(c′, c)− pi(c′, c′)−K(c′, c) = 0 (8)
Furthermore, the strategic incentives with cooperative R&D and fixed-fee licensing under
patent protection are given by
S(C)− S(FL) = F
2
> 0 (9)
which shows that cooperative R&D of firms induces more strategic incentive for R&D
than that of fixed-fee licensing under patent protection. Thus, to increase R&D incentive,
cooperative R&D strictly dominates fixed-fee licensing under patent protection.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that patent protection with cooperative R&D option
is always preferred to increase incentives for and the equilibrium level of R&D,
compared to other three regimes: non-patent protection, patent protection with
imitation; but may dominate patent protection with royalty licensing.
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